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Abstract. Hylomorphism provides an attractive framework for addressing 
issues in philosophical anthropology. After describing a  hylomorphic theory 
that dovetails with current work in philosophy of mind and in scientific 
disciplines such as biology and neuroscience, I discuss how this theory meshes 
with Christian eschatology, the doctrine of resurrection in particular.
THe HYlomorPHIC WorlDVIeW
Hylomorphism claims that structure, organization, form, arrangement, 
order, or configuration is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. 
Some individuals – living things, for instance – consist of materials 
that are structured or organized in various ways. You and I  are not 
mere quantities of fundamental physical materials; we are quantities of 
fundamental physical materials with a certain organization or structure. 
That structure is responsible for you and I being humans as opposed to 
dogs or rocks, and it is responsible for you and I having the particular 
developmental, metabolic, reproductive, perceptive, and cognitive 
capacities we have.
I’ll illustrate this basic idea with three examples. The first I’ll call the 
squashing example. Suppose we put Godehard in a strong bag – a very 
strong bag since we want to ensure that nothing leaks out when we 
squash him with several tons of force. before the squashing the contents 
of the bag include one human being; after they include none. In addition, 
before the squashing the contents of the bag can think, feel, and act, but 
after the squashing they can’t.
What explains these differences in the contents of the bag pre-
squashing and post-squashing? The physical materials (whether particles 
or stuffs) remain the same – none of them leaked out. Intuitively we want 
198 WIllIAm JAWorSKI
to say that what changed was the way those materials were structured or 
organized. That organization or structure was responsible for there being 
a human before the squashing, and for that human having the capacities 
it had. once that structure was destroyed, there no longer was a human 
with those capacities. Structure is thus a  basic ontological principle; 
it concerns what things there are. And it is also a  basic explanatory 
principle; it concerns what things can do.
A second example introduces hylomorphism by contrasting it with 
a  more familiar view: physicalism. Physicalism claims that everything 
is physical; everything can be exhaustively described and explained 
in principle by physics. To appreciate what this means, let’s imagine 
a character: the super physicist, a being that possesses complete physical 
knowledge of the universe. The super physicist has complete knowledge 
of all the fundamental physical entities in the universe: what they are, 
what properties they have, what relations they stand in, and what laws 
govern their behaviour. Imagine, however, that the super physicist lacks 
a psychological conceptual framework and even a biological one. It lacks 
the perceptual and conceptual tools to distinguish living things from 
nonliving ones or mental beings from nonmental ones. The concepts of 
life, perception, desire, belief, money, and so on are completely beyond 
its ken. As a  result, when it describes the universe, its descriptions 
are framed solely in the vocabulary of physics – solely in terms of the 
characteristics of fundamental physical particles or stuffs. because 
the super physicist does not have the concepts to distinguish living 
things from nonliving ones or mental beings from nonmental ones, its 
descriptions make no mention of plants, animals, or people, nor do they 
mention any distinctive biological or psychological activities such as 
growth, reproduction, perception, or belief. Nor can the super physicist 
recognize the distinctions these things mark in the natural world. It 
recognizes no difference between Godehard and the surrounding air, 
for instance. From its standpoint, there is just a continuous curtain of 
fundamental physical particles or stuffs.
many people would be inclined to say that the super physicist’s 
descriptions of the world would be missing some very important things: 
the distinction between life and nonlife or between intelligence and 
nonintelligence, not to mention the stock of things that tend to occupy 
most people’s minds: money, food, sex, family, health, professional success. 
If physicalism is true, however, the super physicist’s description misses 
nothing. Since everything can be exhaustively described and explained by 
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physics, the super physicist’s descriptions of the universe are complete as 
they stand. If you and I describe the universe in ways that recognize the 
distinctions between living things and nonliving ones or mental beings 
and nonmental ones, that is a comment not necessarily about what the 
universe contains but about how we go about describing it.
Hylomorphists disagree. In particular, they claim the super physicist 
misses the variety of ways physical materials are structured or organized 
in the natural world – ways that mark the difference between living and 
nonliving, mental and nonmental; that distinguish Godehard from the 
surrounding air, and that confer on the particles or stuffs located exactly 
where he is the unity that makes him a distinctive whole.
A  third way of illustrating the basic hylomorphic idea of structure 
involves the empirical appeals to structure we find in sciences like biology 
and biological subdisciplines such as neuroscience. Scientists frequently 
appeal to notions of structure, order, or arrangement. At least some of 
these appeals appear to be ontologically serious; that is, they appear to 
posit structure as a real ontological and explanatory principle. Here is 
an example taken from a popular college-level biology textbook – note 
the references to organization, order, arrangement, and related notions:
life is highly organized into a hierarchy of structural levels, with each 
level building on the levels below it  ... biological order exists at all 
levels ... [A]toms ... are ordered into complex biological molecules ... the 
molecules of life are arranged into minute structures called organelles, 
which are in turn the components of cells. Cells are [in turn] subunits 
of organisms ... The organism we recognize as an animal or plant is not 
a random collection of individual cells, but a multicellular cooperative ... 
Identifying biological organization at its many levels is fundamental to 
the study of life ... With each step upward in the hierarchy of biological 
order, novel properties emerge that were not present at the simpler 
levels of organization ... A molecule such as a protein has attributes not 
exhibited by any of its component atoms, and a cell is certainly much 
more than a bag of molecules. If the intricate organization of the human 
brain is disrupted by a  head injury, that organ will cease to function 
properly ... And an organism is a living whole greater than the sum of its 
parts ... [W]e cannot fully explain a higher level of order by breaking it 
down into its parts (Campbell 1996: 2-4).
This passage suggests that organization, order, structure, or arrangement 
is a real feature of things, one that plays an important role in them being 
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the kinds of things they are, and in explaining the kinds of things they 
can do. It suggests, in other words, that structure is a real ontological and 
explanatory principle.
This idea is echoed by other scientists and by some philosophers.1 The 
biologist ernst mayr is an example:
All biologists  ... recognize no supernatural or immaterial forces, but 
only such that are physico-chemical  ... [T]he modern biologist rejects 
in any form whatsoever the notion that a  ‘vital force’ exists in living 
organisms which does not obey the laws of physics  ... All processes in 
organisms ... strictly obey these physical laws ... but [biologists] do not 
accept the naïve mechanistic explanation of the seventeenth century and 
disagree with the statement that animals are ‘nothing but’ machines  ... 
Where organisms differ from inanimate matter is in the organization of 
their systems ... [o]rganisms have many characteristics that are without 
parallel in the world of inanimate objects. The explanatory equipment 
of the physical sciences is insufficient to explain complex living systems 
(mayr 1982: 2, 52).
empirical appeals to structure of the foregoing sort provide a  way of 
understanding what hylomorphism claims.
many philosophers find empirical appeals to structure like these 
obvious and unremarkable: How could anyone question (and hence 
why would anyone bother to mention) that structure factors into things? 
but the notion of structure does not come for free – at least not if we 
endorse what I’ll call ‘ontological naturalism’, a  position that conjoins 
a Quinean view of ontological commitment with a broad empiricism: 
We are committed to all the entities postulated by our best descriptions 
and explanations of reality, and those descriptions and explanations 
derive from empirical sources, paradigmatically the natural and social 
sciences. If we accept ontological naturalism, appeals to structure like 
the foregoing make a serious ontological demand. We can try to satisfy it 
in at least four different ways.
Three of these ways claim, contrary to what the foregoing quotes 
suggest, that everything can be exhaustively described and explained 
without appealing to structure, that appeals to structure can either be 
eliminated, reduced, or paraphrased so that we need not in principle 
1 examples include J.b.S. Haldane (1947: 54-56), Gerd Sommerhoff (1969: 147-148), 
J.Z. Young (1971: 86-87), Jonathan miller (1982: 140-141), michael ruse (2001: 79), John 
locke (1959: book II, Chapter 27, Sections 5-9), and John Dewey (1958: 253-8).
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speak as if structure really exists. Daniel Dennett (1991) has a view of 
this sort; he claims that we postulate patterns or structures purely as 
a matter of explanatory or predictive convenience.2
unlike views of this sort, hylomorphism takes claims about structure 
in the sciences at face value. It takes structure to be a real, irreducible 
ontological and explanatory factor – a view I’ll call structure realism.3
Structure realism by itself is compatible with physicalism. It could 
turn out that there are structures, but that the only structures that exist 
are those postulated by physics. Structure realism is also compatible 
with views like substance dualism.4 Yet neither of these is the kind of 
view expressed in the foregoing passages from biologists. That view is 
committed to the claim that we are organisms, contrary to substance 
dualism. And it is committed to the claim that there are basic structures 
other than those postulated by physics, contrary to physicalism. It 
distinguishes what physics by itself can describe and explain from what 
appeals to biological, or psychological, or social structure enable us to 
describe and explain. because of this, its exponents often claim that 
organisms are not mere machines, as mayr puts it, but have characteristics 
– emergent properties, to use Campbell’s term – not found among 
nonliving things, and so they conclude that the explanatory apparatus of 
physics is insufficient to describe and explain living behaviour; it gets at 
‘only half the truth’, as the cyberneticist Gerd Sommerhoff (1969) puts it. 
What it misses are the things that can only be described and explained 
2 This is also a  view mark Johnston describes (and rejects): ‘When certain items 
come to stand in certain relations  ... there then comes to be some further item which 
has those original items as parts. That is ... how we have such complex items as model 
airplanes, trains, and molecules  ... [J]ust why are those relations  ... “item-generators”, 
while other relations ... seem impotent in the production of new items?... Could it just be 
a projection of our idiosyncratic way of experiencing and conceptualizing reality, so that 
things considered in themselves are not complex, but are so only relative to a scheme of 
clumping or bundling? Somehow, I doubt it’ (Johnston 2006: 652).
3 This should not be confused with the view ladyman and ross (2007) call ‘structural 
realism’. Their view rejects commonsense things, and takes a  stance on the empirical 
contents of physics. Structure realism does neither.
4 Substance dualism claims that persons, such as you and I, are distinct from human 
organisms; we are nonphysical entities. Suppose that substance dualism is true, and 
further, that human organisms consist of physical materials that are structured a certain 
way. The upshot is a  substance dualistic view that is committed to hylomorphism. 
Structure is a basic principle that factors into descriptions of what human organisms are 
and what they can do; it simply doesn’t factor into descriptions of what we, nonphysical 
persons, are and what we can do.
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by appeal to structure at a biological, psychological, or social level. I’ll 
reserve the term ‘hylomorphism’ for a structure realist view of this sort.
Since the label ‘hylomorphism’ is not new it’s worth mentioning that 
the view I  have in mind differs from those of Kit Fine (1999), mark 
Johnston (2006), David oderberg (2007), and Kathryn Koslicki (2008). 
moreover, I  cannot vouch for its similarities to the views of Aristotle, 
Aquinas, leibniz, merleau-Ponty, or any of the other philosophers whose 
views have been labelled ‘hylomorphic’.5 It is nevertheless very similar to 
the view montgomery Furth (1978) attributes to Aristotle.6
The foregoing passages from biologists suggest a hylomorphic view 
with at least five characteristics. First, hylomorphism takes the distinction 
between living things and nonliving ones (and also, as we’ll see, between 
mental beings and nonmental ones) to be grounded in their organization 
or structure.7 These distinctions are due not to the entities that compose 
them, but to the way those entities are structured or organized.
Second, living things such as human beings are exhaustively 
decomposable into particles or materials of the sort described by physics, 
the very same particles or materials found in nonliving things. Someone 
5 For Aristotle’s view see Physics, book II, Chapters 1-3, and on the Soul, as well as 
Nussbaum and Putnam (1992). For Aquinas’ view see Summa Theologiae Ia, Questions 
75-86, and leftow (2001); for more on leibniz see Garber (1985) and Smith (2002), and 
see merleau-Ponty (2002) for his view.
6 ‘[The world] is an empedoclean, finite three-dimensional mass, entirely filled with 
the four elements  ... [W]e now observe that scattered through this three-dimensional 
mass there are innumerable knots, regions where the matter is elaborately and intricately 
worked up into an organic unity ... highly convoluted but relatively stable eddies in the 
general commingling-and-separation [of elements]  ... Aristotle thinks the “principle” 
called “form” must be brought in on top of the empedoclean basis, to explain the stability 
of the knots and the complex specific character that they manifest as long as they last ... 
a material individual (i.e., animal) is  ... a semipermanent warp or bend informing the 
local matter, which the matter flows through at various rates during the organism’s life 
history ... while the form imposes the continuity ...’ (Furth 1978: 638-9). one difference 
between the view I have in mind and Aristotle’s is that the view I have in mind is not 
committed to a  specific account of fundamental physical entities. It does not claim 
that they are empedoclean stuffs, as Aristotle’s account does, but is happy to leave it to 
physicists to determine what they are.
7 Hylomorphism is thus at odds with views that ground these distinctions in the 
particles or materials that compose things. Democritus, for instance, claimed that the 
differences between living things and nonliving ones could be explained by a  greater 
proportion of spherical atoms. more recently, roger Penrose has suggested that the 
difference between conscious beings and nonconscious ones can be explained by 
differences among their quantum-level components.
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could endorse a hylomorphic view according to which living or mental 
beings have nonphysical components. Aquinas, for instance, may have 
endorsed a  view of this sort. The hylomorphic view I  have in mind, 
however, rejects this idea. It is committed instead to the empirical claim 
expressed in the quote from mayr: living, mental beings such as humans 
have only physical components; they are exhaustively decomposable into 
the same fundamental physical materials found in nonliving things.
Third, because organisms consist of both structures and materials that 
are structured, hylomorphists claim that a  complete account of living 
behaviour must appeal to both. This claim has at least two important 
implications. First, it implies a pluralism of properties.
on the hylomorphic view, living things have properties of at least 
two sorts: properties that are due to their structures (or their integration 
into individuals with structures), and properties that are due to their 
materials alone independent of the way those materials are structured. 
Consider an example. Subatomic particles, atoms, and molecules have 
physical properties such as mass irrespective of their surroundings. 
under the right conditions, however, they can contribute to the activities 
of living things. Nucleic acids, hormones, and neural transmitters are 
examples; they are genes, growth factors, and metabolic and behavioural 
regulators. each admits of two types of descriptions which express 
two types of properties. They can be described organically, in terms of 
the contributions they make to a  structured system, but they are also 
independently describable in nonorganic, non-contribution-oriented 
terms. Descriptions of the former, organic sort express the properties 
characteristic of organisms and their parts. Descriptions of the latter, 
nonorganic sort express the properties things possess independent of 
their integration into organic wholes. A  strand of DNA might always 
have various atomic or fundamental physical properties regardless of its 
environment, but it acquires new properties when it is integrated into 
a cell and begins making contributions to the cell’s activities. It becomes 
a gene, a part of the cell that plays a role in, for instance, protein synthesis.
Some people call these new properties ‘emergent properties’ 
(Campbell in the earlier quote is an example). emergent properties have 
several characteristics (Jaworski 2011). I won’t describe them in detail 
here; I’ll simply note in passing that included here there is no condition 
that requires emergent properties to be produced or generated by lower-
level things. That is because hylomorphists, unlike classic emergentists, 
deny that this is the case. Structure, they say, is basic. It is not generated 
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by anything. We can, as an empirical matter of fact, they say, describe 
how particular structures came to be in place: my distinctively human 
structure came initially to inform various biotic materials because of my 
parents’ reproductive activity. What hylomorphists deny is that it would 
be legitimate to ask what it currently is that is responsible for continually 
generating the structure I  have. Structures are not generated by the 
things they structure.
There are, then, properties that depend on something’s structure 
and properties that things possess independent of a broader structure. 
According to hylomorphists, properties of both sorts make causal or 
explanatory contributions to the things having them. These contributions 
reflect a  second implication of the idea that a  complete account of 
living behaviour must appeal to both structure and materials that are 
structured, namely, causal pluralism: there are different kinds of causal or 
explanatory factors, and different kinds of causal or explanatory relations.
A  car crash, for instance, involves the convergence of numerous 
factors – faulty brakes, insufficient roadway grading, inadequate signage, 
and alcohol. The ways these factors contribute to the crash vary. We can 
understand how the brakes and the roadway contribute purely by appeal 
to physics. understanding how the alcohol contributes, by contrast – its 
effects on, say, perception and reaction time – requires the conceptual 
resources of biology, and understanding how the inadequate signage 
contributes requires the conceptual resources of psychology – resources 
for understanding how animals like us can use symbolic systems and 
modulate their behaviour in light of the information those systems convey.
one way of giving content to the idea that there are different kinds 
of causes and causal relations is to view causal relations as explanatory 
ones, and to view explanations as answers to certain kinds of questions. 
Aristotle defended an account of causation and explanation along these 
lines. A cause (aitia), he said, was an answer to the question dia ti: ‘Why?’ 
or ‘on account of what?’ (Physics 194b16-20). bas van Fraassen has made 
a similar claim: ‘An explanation’, he says, ‘is an answer to a why-question’ 
(1980: 134). elsewhere I’ve developed this idea not just with regard to 
why-questions but also how-questions since many how-questions are 
requests for explanation as well (Jaworski 2009). examining the logic of 
why- and how-questions can thus provide a starting point for cataloguing 
the range of explanatory factors and relations we seek to understand 
when we ask ‘Why?’ or ‘How?’.
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A  quick illustration: van Fraassen has shown that explanation is 
contrastive. When we ask why something happened – e.g. ‘Why did 
Adam eat the apple?’ – it remains unclear exactly what we are saying: Do 
we mean ‘Why did Adam eat the apple (in contrast to the papaya, or the 
mango, or ...)?’. or do we mean ‘Why did Adam eat the apple (in contrast 
to having thrown it away, or having done something else with it)?’ or 
do we mean why did Adam eat the apple (in contrast to the serpent or 
someone else)? A similar point comes out with how-questions.
‘How did Judith kill Holofernes?’
Answer A: ‘With a mixture of revulsion and determination.’
Answer b: ‘With a mixture of bile and snake venom.’
Answer C: ‘With a mixture of seduction and cunning.’
The first answer supplies the manner; the second supplies the method, and 
the third supplies the means. manners, methods, and means are among the 
things we ask about with how-questions. We also ask about mechanisms.
How-questions of mechanism request what some philosophers 
of neuroscience call mechanistic explanations (bechtel 2007). They 
explain how a system is able to perform an activity by describing how 
the activities of its subsystems contribute to it. (I’ll return to this idea 
momentarily when I  discuss functional analysis, the method whereby 
empirical researchers discover mechanisms.)
So on this view causes and causal relations are explanatory. by 
examining the range of ways we explain things in our pedestrian dealings 
and in our scientific practices we can start compiling an inventory of the 
kinds of causes and causal relations there are.
A  fourth feature of the hylomorphic view is this: because living 
things are composed of fundamental physical entities, their behaviour 
never violates fundamental physical laws, the laws governing their 
fundamental physical constituents.
Fifth, hylomorphism’s view of structure is closely related to an account 
of composition or parthood. According to hylomorphists, lower-level 
entities such as atoms and electrons qualify as parts of higher-level 
entities such as organisms by virtue of contributing to their activities. 
An electron is a part of me, for instance, exactly if it contributes to my 
overall functioning – if, say, it contributes to depolarizing one of my 
cellular membranes or plays a role in the metabolic processes of one of 
my cells. Consider again the strand of DNA. When it is integrated into 
a cell, it makes a goal-directed contribution to the activity of the whole. 
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As a result, it gains the status of an organic part. It and parts like it are 
literally organ-ized in living things: they become organs.
on the hylomorphic view of composition, then, parts contribute to 
the activities of the wholes they compose, and different parts of a whole 
contribute to its activities in different ways.
Peter van Inwagen has recently defended a  similar account of 
composition. According to van Inwagen, something qualifies as a part 
if and only if it is ‘caught up in a life’, an expression he borrows from the 
biologist J.Z. Young. He explains with an example:
Alice drinks a cup of tea in which a lump of sugar has been dissolved. 
A certain carbon atom ... is carried along ... by Alice’s digestive system 
to the intestine. It passes through the intestinal wall and into the 
bloodstream, whence it is carried to the biceps muscle of Alice’s left arm. 
There it is oxidized in several indirect stages (yielding  ... energy  ... for 
muscular contraction) and is finally carried by Alice’s circulatory system 
to her lungs and ... breathed out as a part of a carbon dioxide molecule ... 
Here we have a case in which a thing, the carbon atom, was ... caught up 
in the life of an organism, Alice. It is ... a case in which a thing became 
however briefly, a part of a  larger thing when it was a part of nothing 
before or after ... (Van Inwagen: 94-5)
Hylomorphism’s account of composition can be understood as a  way 
of elaborating van Inwagen’s basic idea: to be caught up in the life of 
something is to make a goal-directed contribution to its activities, where 
it is up to biologists, neuroscientists, and other empirical investigators to 
describe the nature of this goal-directed contribution.
An account of composition like this has also been endorsed by several 
philosophers of biology including William bechtel, a  philosopher of 
neuroscience. According to bechtel, something qualifies as a component 
part of a complex system – what he calls a mechanism – only if it performs 
an operation that contributes to the activity of the whole.8
8 The hylomorphic view of parts and wholes assumes a  specific kind of meta-
mereology. Kathrin Koslicki describes it this way: ‘I take the mereologist’s job to be to 
devise an appropriate conception of parthood and composition which accurately reflects 
the conditions of existence, spatio-temporal location and part/whole structure of those 
objects to which we take ourselves to be already committed as part of the presupposed 
scientifically informed, commonsense ontology. The question of which kinds [of objects] 
there are I take to be ... answered [not] by the mereologist proper, but by the ontologist 
at large, in conjunction with ... science and common sense, which ... have something to 
contribute to the question, “What is there?” ... [m]ereology ... does not settle matters of 
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Philosophers of biology and neuroscience, like bechtel, have been 
attracted to a view of composition along these lines because this is the 
type of view suggested by actual work in biology and neuroscience – 
both the methods of those sciences and the kinds of explanations they 
employ. of central importance is a  method of scientific investigation 
philosophers have sometimes called ‘functional analysis’ (other names 
include ‘mechanical decomposition’ or ‘functional decomposition’). 
biologists, cognitive scientists, engineers, and others frequently employ 
this method to understand how complex systems operate. They analyze 
the activities of those systems into simpler subactivities performed by 
simpler subsystems.9
Consider a  complex human activity such as running. Functional 
analysis reveals that running involves among other things a circulatory 
subsystem that is responsible for supplying oxygenated blood to the 
muscles. Analysis of that subsystem reveals that it has a  component 
responsible for pumping the blood – a  heart. Analysis of the heart’s 
pumping activity shows that it is composed of muscle tissues that 
undergo frequent contraction and relaxation, and these activities can 
be analyzed into the subactivities of various cells. Analyses of these 
subactivities reveal the operation of various organelles that compose 
the cell and that are composed in turn of complex molecules. We can 
continue to iterate the process until we reach a level at which no further 
functional analysis is possible. If, for instance, electrons contribute 
to the activities of things by virtue of having negative charges, and 
they have those charges not on account of the activities of some yet 
lower-level subsystems, but as an unanalyzable matter of fact, then no 
further functional analysis is possible. We reach a foundational level of 
functional parts.
ontological commitment; rather, it presupposes them to be resolved elsewhere within 
metaphysics or outside of philosophy altogether  ... [This] approach differs from the 
standard conception as well as from Fine’s theory of embodiments  ... which view the 
mereologist as a specialized sort of ontologist, whose job ... is precisely to tell us what 
mereologically complex objects (if any) the world contains  ... [b]y presupposing that 
the question, “What mereologically complex objects (if any) are there?” is descriptively 
settled in the course of arriving at a  scientifically and commonsensically acceptable 
ontology of kinds, the present approach assigns to the mereologist proper a more limited 
set of responsibilities ... characteriz[ing] ... those mereologically complex entities whose 
existence is already confirmed by independent evidence’ (2008: 171).
9 See, for instance, Fodor (1968), Cummins (1975), Dennett (1978), lycan (1987 
Chapter 4), bechtel (2007), and Craver (2007: Chapter 5).
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Functional analysis provides a way of supplying empirical content to 
the idea that parts contribute to the activities of their respective wholes. 
If we want to know how a part contributes to the activity of a whole, 
hylomorphism leaves it to the relevant empirical disciplines to tell us.
Two clarifications are in order about functional analysis. First, 
a remark about the name: ‘Functional analysis’ is a name that has been 
used by philosophers, but biologists often call the method ‘reduction’. 
This notion of reduction is different from the notion typically discussed 
in connection with the philosophy of mind (Jaworski 2011). reduction 
in the philosophy of mind typically concerns the ability of one 
conceptual framework to take over the descriptive and explanatory roles 
of another. To claim that, say, psychology is reducible to neuroscience 
implies that it is possible in principle for neuroscience to take over all 
the descriptive and explanatory roles psychology currently plays. Any 
description or explanation we would normally express in psychological 
terms could be rewritten in principle solely in neuroscientific terms. If 
this kind of rewriting were possible, then neuroscience would be capable 
of taking over all the descriptive and explanatory roles psychology plays. 
Psychology would be reducible to neuroscience.
by contrast, when biologists speak of reduction they are typically 
not speaking of the relation between conceptual frameworks I’ve just 
described, but of a  method for studying complex systems – what I’ve 
been calling ‘functional analysis’. Here is an example taken from the 
biology textbook quoted earlier:
reductionism – reducing complex systems to simpler components that 
are more manageable to study – is a  powerful strategy in biology  ... 
biology balances the reductionist strategy with the longer-range objective 
of understanding how the parts of cells, organisms, and higher levels 
of order, such as ecosystems, are functionally integrated (Campbell, et 
al. 1999: 4).
The authors clearly have in mind what they call a research strategy – a 
method for studying complex things. A commitment to employing this 
method does not imply a commitment to reduction in the philosophical 
sense. It might be impossible for neuroscience to take over the descriptive 
and explanatory roles of psychological discourse even though it is 
possible and even necessary to use functional analysis to understand how 
humans can engage in psychological activities.11 In fact, this is precisely 
what hylomorphists claim. explanations of living behaviour are not 
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reducible to descriptions of the lower-level mechanisms revealed by 
functional analysis because of the distinctive explanatory contributions 
a living thing’s biological, psychological, and social structures make.10
Why should we believe that hylomorphists are right about higher-level 
structures making explanatory contributions beyond the contributions 
made by their lower-level parts? Hylomorphists insist that this is sup-
ported by empirical considerations. As an empirical matter of fact, they 
say, higher-level structural discourse provides effective descriptions and 
explanations independent of any claims about reducibility. Consider 
bechtel’s observations about descriptions and explanations in psychology 
and other special sciences:
[The] mechanistic explanations [provided by functional analysis] are in 
fact compatible with a robust sense of autonomy for psychology and other 
special sciences ... In virtue of being organized systems, mechanisms do 
things beyond what their components do  ... organization itself is not 
something inherent in the parts. Accordingly, investigators who already 
understand in detail how the parts behave are often surprised by what 
happens when they are organized in particular ways ... [T]he organization 
of the components typically integrates them into an entity that has an 
identity of its own. As a result, organized mechanisms become the focus 
of relatively autonomous disciplines  ... This autonomy maintains that 
psychology and other special sciences study phenomena that are outside 
the scope of more basic sciences but which determine the conditions 
under which lower-level components interact. In contrast, the lower-
level inquiries focus on how the components of mechanisms operate 
when in those conditions ... The fact that mechanisms perform different 
activities than do their parts manifests itself in the fact that the activities 
of whole mechanisms are typically described in [a] different vocabulary 
than are component operations. Traditional accounts of theory reduction 
implicitly recognized this fact by requiring bridge principles to connect 
the different vocabularies used in different sciences, but little notice was 
given as to why different sciences employ different vocabularies. The 
vocabulary used in each science describes different types of entities and 
different operations – one describes the parts and what they do, whereas 
another describes the whole system and what it does (2007: 174, 185-186).
10 John bickle (2003) refers to the philosophical sense of reduction as ‘ruthless 
reduction’; bechtel (2007: 173-4) and others have distinguished this from reduction in 
the methodological sense – what we are calling ‘functional analysis’.
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If bechtel’s observations of scientific practice are correct, higher-level 
empirical disciplines and lower-level ones have different subject-matters 
on account of the ways things are organized or structured. because higher- 
and lower-level disciplines deal with different subject-matters, they 
have different vocabularies, and provide different kinds of explanations, 
and these different vocabularies and explanations make higher-level 
disciplines autonomous – irreducible to lower-level disciplines in the 
traditional philosophical sense. In light of these kinds of observations 
about the autonomy of higher-level sciences, and the role structure or 
organization plays in explaining it, hylomorphists insist that the burden 
of proof is on their opponents to establish that claims about biological, 
psychological, or social structures are reducible to claims about things 
that lack them.
A second note about functional analysis: the notion of function that 
gives functional analysis its name is different from the notion of function 
discussed in connection with functionalism in philosophy of mind. 
According to classic functionalist theories of mind, mental states are 
postulates of abstract descriptions framed in terms analogous to those 
used in computer science – descriptions that ignore the physical details 
of a system, and focus simply on a narrow profile of its features: inputs to 
it, outputs from it, and internal states that correlate the two.11
When it comes to functional analysis, by contrast, the notion of 
a function is not abstract in this way, and it has a teleological dimension: 
subsystems contribute to the activities of the wholes to which they 
belong, and that contribution is their reason or ‘purpose’ for belonging 
to the system: the purpose of the spark plug is to ignite the fuel; the 
purpose of the heart is to pump the blood, and so on.
Teleological functionalism is a type of functionalist theory that appeals 
to a  teleological notion of function along these lines as well. lycan’s 
11 See Hilary Putnam’s ‘The mental life of Some machines’, ‘The Nature of mental 
States’, and ‘robots: machines or Artificially Created life?’, in Putnam (1975). According 
to Putnam’s original proposal, psychological descriptions are abstract descriptions that 
postulate relations among sensory inputs, motor outputs, and internal mental states. 
The only significant difference between Turing machine descriptions and psychological 
descriptions, Putnam suggested, was that psychological inputs, outputs, and internal 
states were related to each other probabilistically not deterministically. If, for instance, 
eleanor believes there are exactly eight planets in our solar system, and she receives the 
auditory input, ‘Do you believe there are exactly eight planets in our solar system?’, then 
she will produce the verbal output, ‘Yes’, not with a deterministic probability of 1, but 
with a probability between 1 and 0.
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(1987: Chapter 4) homunctionalism is an example.12 like functionalist 
theories of all sorts, however, teleological functionalism claims that 
higher-level discourse is abstract discourse; higher-level properties are 
higher-order properties – logical constructions that quantify over lower-
order properties. Saying that something has a belief, for instance, amounts 
merely to saying that it has some internal state that correlates inputs with 
outputs in appropriate ways. Hylomorphists reject this understanding 
of higher-level properties. They claim that higher-level properties 
are first-order properties in their own right. So although teleological 
functionalists and hylomorphists both claim that a system’s components 
contribute teleologically to its overall operation, they disagree about how 
the notion of contribution is to be understood. Teleological functionalists 
say that descriptions of higher-level phenomena are simply abstract 
descriptions of lower-level occurrences. Hylomorphists deny this. 
Higher-level descriptions correspond to distinctive natural structures, 
ones that factor into descriptions and explanations of living behaviour in 
ways that cannot be eliminated, reduced to, or paraphrased in favour of 
lower-level descriptions and explanations.
let this suffice for a  description of the general hylomorphic view. 
I’ve discussed an argument for it in detail elsewhere (Jaworski 2011: 
Chapter 10; cf. ellis 2002: 173). rather than rehearsing it here, I want to 
consider a hylomorphic approach to mental capacities – what I will call 
a hylomorphic theory of mind. It takes the biological notion of structure 
we’ve been focusing on and extends it into the psychological domain.
PATTerNS oF beHAVIour: A HYlomorPHIC THeorY oF mIND
The grail of philosophy of mind for over 40 years has been an acceptable 
mind-body theory that is both antireductive and broadly naturalistic – a 
theory that affirms that we are physical beings with physical components, 
but that also denies that biology, psychology, and other special sciences 
are reducible to physics. Theories of this sort include various forms 
of nonreductive physicalism and emergentism. Hylomorphism is 
a  theory   of this sort, but it rejects both physicalism and some of the 
central tenets of emergentism. I’ll briefly describe the basic idea behind 
a hylomorphic theory of mind before turning to the question of whether 
hylomorphism is compatible with the doctrine of resurrection.
12 See also Sober (1985: Section 3).
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When people think of structures they often think of what we might 
call mechanical structures or mechanisms: spatial arrangements among 
a thing’s parts that enable those parts to interact in novel ways – ways 
that confer on the whole capacities not had by the parts taken in 
isolation. Hylomorphists acknowledge the existence of mechanisms, 
but they insist that mechanical structures are not the only kinds of 
structures that exist. biological organization also comprises patterns of 
behaviour – the characteristic ways that living things interact with each 
other and their environments.
living things do not act at random. birds build nests not webs, and 
lay eggs not acorns. Humans grow lungs instead of gills, and skin instead 
of scales. Squirrels bury nuts, and are active during the day; raccoons 
come out at night, and rummage through our garbage. All of these are 
examples of patterns in living behaviour. Just as the parts of living things 
are not assembled at random but have distinctive structures, so too the 
behaviour of living things is characterized by distinctive patterns of 
social and environmental interaction.
Some of these patterns involve the ways organisms acquire and utilize 
energy from the environment to maintain their distinctive structures 
against entropy. others involve their abilities to respond to and interact 
with features of their environments – their capacities for sensation and 
movement, for instance. Yet other patterns involve states of motivation 
or arousal such as hunger, thirst, fear, anger, and enjoyment; and still 
others involve cognitive capacities such as memory, learning, reasoning, 
and problem solving.
According to hylomorphists, the patterns we find in the living world 
include mental phenomena. Thought, feeling, perception, and action are 
all patterns of social and environmental interaction. Some we describe in 
perceptual or sensory terms: seeing, hearing, tasting, feeling. others are 
more complex and incorporate perceptual or sensory patterns of these 
sorts. They include believing, wanting, knowing, and remembering. These 
higher-level patterns, moreover, are often integrated into behavioural 
patterns that are more complex still such as intellectual habits or 
personality or character traits. Consider an example: The interactions 
between a young child and the candy hidden in the cupboard are at first 
almost completely unstructured – or more precisely, they are structured 
in ways we can describe and explain merely by appeal to physics: the 
child and the candy exert a  gravitational influence on each other, for 
instance. but the interactions between the child and the candy become 
213HYlomorPHISm AND THe reSurreCTIoN
structured in more complex ways once the cupboard door is opened. We 
describe these ways using a psychological vocabulary: we say the child 
wants the candy, is trying to get it, and remembers that it is there once its 
mother has re-closed the cupboard door. The same is true of the child’s 
interactions with its mother and with other people: it is chagrined and 
frustrated by her refusal to give the candy, but knows that its father is 
more pliable. Similarly, the father’s pliability and the mother’s prudence 
are also types of complex structured behaviour. They represent broad 
patterns of choice, decision, thought, feeling, and action with long 
histories and long-term implications for future behaviour.
The core idea of a hylomorphic theory of mind, then, is that sensations, 
feelings, thoughts, perceptions, actions, and other psychological phenom-
ena are complex patterns of social and environmental interaction like 
the patterns just described. They are ways animals like us interact with 
each other and the environment – ways in which our behaviour is 
structured or organized. living things are not just organized assemblages 
of parts; they are zones of structured activities. These activities include 
muscular contractions, bodily movements, and other physiological 
states as lower-level contributing factors, but they also include higher-
level interactions with other living things and the environment. Human 
behaviour in particular comprises biological activities and capacities 
that are incorporated into patterns of rational interaction, patterns that 
admit of evaluation in terms of rational, moral, aesthetic, and similar 
categories. What get structured in these rational ways include the states 
and subactivities of various organic parts, such as the parts that enable 
humans to perceive aspects of their social and physical environments 
and to feel and respond to those features. These forms of engagement 
and response, and the criteria we use to evaluate them are in part what 
we refer to and describe when using psychological predicates and 
terms. on the hylomorphic view, then, we use psychological discourse 
to describe high-level structured behaviours that have various organic 
states as lower-level contributing substructures.13
13 The idea that mental phenomena are patterns of social and environmental 
interaction is liable to remind some readers of behaviourism, and others of Dennett’s 
(1992) real patterns. elsewhere I’ve described in detail how hylomorphism differs 
from these views (Jaworski 2011; Jaworski 2012). briefly, hylomorphism (of the sort 
we are considering) rejects physicalism, whereas behaviourism and Dennett do not. 
In addition, hylomorphists do not conceive of behaviour as narrowly as behaviourists 
do. According to hylomorphists, behaviour comprises not mere bodily movements 
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elsewhere I’ve shown in detail how a hylomorphic framework like the 
one I’ve just described is able to solve mind-body problems such as 
the problem of mental causation, the problem of emergence, and the 
problem of other minds (Jaworski 2011; Jaworski 2012). my goal here, 
however, is to explain why such a view is compatible with the doctrine of 
resurrection. I will call this the ‘compatibility thesis’. To frame discussion 
of the compatibility thesis I will consider an argument against it:
(1) If hylomorphism is true, then I will be raised from the dead only if 
(a) God can bring it about that some materials have a distinctively 
human structure, and (b) God can ensure that those structured 
materials compose me and not someone else. [Premise]
(2) God cannot satisfy conditions (a) and (b) at a time after I die. [Premise]
Therefore, if hylomorphism is true, I will not be raised from the dead.
The inference is valid, so if the premises are true, the compatibility 
thesis is false. Support for Premise 1 derives from a  plausible line of 
reasoning. If hylomorphism is true, then I am essentially materials with 
a distinctively human structure. I am, moreover, essentially myself and 
not someone else. From these claims it follows that at any time at which 
I exist there must be materials that have a distinctively human structure 
and that compose me and not someone else at that time. Suppose now 
that I have been raised from the dead at time t. In that case I must exist 
at t, for I take it that the idea of resurrection entails that the individual 
who is raised from dead is I myself and no one else. If hylomorphism is 
true, this implies that at t there must be materials that have a distinctively 
human structure and that compose me and no one else. Consequently, 
and gestures, as behaviourists suppose; it comprises social and environmental factors 
as well. Third, hylomorphists and behaviourists endorse different semantics for 
psychological expressions. According to behaviourists, psychological expressions 
operate like abbreviations for longer physical descriptions of bodily movements and 
states. According to hylomorphists, by contrast, psychological expressions operate like 
natural kind terms that refer to patterns of social and environmental interaction, and that 
get their referents fixed initially by observing those patterns firsthand (Jaworski 2011: 
334-339). Hylomorphists thus reject the behaviourist project of analyzing psychological 
predicates and terms into longer descriptions of actual and potential bodily movements 
and states. Finally, hylomorphism is committed to structure realism whereas Dennett’s 
view is a variety of structure antirealism. According to him, we postulate patterns simply 
for predictive and explanatory convenience. For more on the varieties of structure 
antirealism see Jaworski (2012).
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if God is to bring it about that I am raised from the dead at t, God must 
bring it about that some materials have a distinctively human structure 
at t and compose me and no one else. It is not enough that God should 
create a mere duplicate of me. It must be the case that by structuring 
materials humanwise at t, God brings it about that I am the individual 
those materials compose.
Premise 2 is supported by another plausible line of reasoning. 
According to hylomorphists, dying is ceasing to exist. When an organism 
dies, the materials that compose it lose their distinctively biological 
structure. but that structure is essential to the organism; the organism 
cannot exist without it. So on the hylomorphic view organisms cease to 
exist when they die. but I am a human organism on the hylomorphic 
view; I  am essentially materials with a  distinctively human structure. 
Consequently, if I  lose that distinctively human structure, then I  will 
cease to exist, and this is precisely what will happen when I die. Now, say 
critics of the compatibility thesis, if something ceases to exist at a time, 
then it is metaphysically impossible for it to exist again at a later time. let 
us call this premise the ‘re-existence restriction’. From the re-existence 
restriction it follows that if hylomorphism is true, I cannot exist at a time 
after I die. but if I cannot exist at a  time after I die, then God cannot 
satisfy conditions (a) and (b) at a  time after I  die, for it is not within 
the scope even of God’s omnipotence to bring about a  metaphysical 
impossibility. If the re-existence restriction obtains, then God cannot 
satisfy (a) and (b) at a  time after I  die any more than God can bring 
about a married bachelor or a four-sided triangle. It might remain within 
God’s power to satisfy condition (a) by itself. God might certainly be able 
to bring it about that some materials get structured humanwise in a way 
that exactly resembles me at a  certain time in my life. but what God 
cannot do if the re-existence restriction obtains is to bring it about that 
those materials compose me and not merely a replica of me. God cannot 
satisfy condition (b) at a time after I die, and so God cannot satisfy the 
conjunction of (a) and (b) at a time after I die.
To defend the compatibility thesis hylomorphists need a response to 
this argument. The response that I want to consider targets Premise 2. 
Defenders of the compatibility thesis can look both to undermine the 
argument for Premise 2 and to argue directly against it. When it comes 
to the first task, there are at least two strategies they can follow. one 
strategy argues that the re-existence restriction fails to obtain in the case 
of resurrection since there are parts of us that continue to exist after we 
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die. Call this the ‘surviving part strategy’. According to one version of it, 
each of us possesses an immaterial part, a rational soul, which persists 
after we die. At the resurrection, God reattaches my rational soul to 
a body, and this ensures that I am the one who is raised and not someone 
else. Something like this, I take it, is Aquinas’ strategy.14 unfortunately, 
this version of the strategy does not appear compatible with the kind 
of hylomorphism I’ve described. That kind of hylomorphism claims 
that we are exhaustively decomposable into fundamental physical 
materials, something that appears incompatible with the existence of an 
immaterial part.
Hylomorphists who endorse the surviving part strategy could 
say one of two things here. First, they could argue that the exhaustive 
decomposition I described earlier is actually compatible with immaterial 
parts in the sense postulated by philosophers like Aquinas since there is 
an equivocation on the term ‘part’. understood in one sense, there are no 
parts other than those that either are fundamental physical particles or 
that are exhaustively decomposable into them. but an immaterial soul 
is not a  part in this sense. Koslicki (2008), for instance, distinguishes 
between formal and material parts. The fundamental physical particles 
that compose me are material parts, whereas an immaterial soul, as 
Aquinas understands it, is a formal part.15 Following this line of reasoning, 
hylomorphists could argue that the earlier claim that organisms are 
exhaustively decomposable into fundamental physical particles remains 
compatible with the existence of immaterial souls, for the earlier claim 
concerns material parts, whereas the latter concerns formal ones.
Alternatively, hylomorphists who endorse the surviving part strategy 
could argue that there are material parts of us that persist after we die. 
each of us is endowed with a unique physical component, they could 
say, one that plays the same theoretical role as an immaterial soul, but 
that does not pose even a prima facie challenge to the claim that we are 
exhaustively decomposable into physical particles.
A  second strategy for undermining the argument for Premise 2 
argues against the re-existence restriction directly. Call this the ‘gappy 
existence strategy’. Hershenov (2003), for instance, argues that there are 
counterexamples to the re-existence restriction. Certain artefacts (some 
artworks, as well as guns, and watches) can remain numerically the same 
14 See for instance Summa Theologiae Ia, 84-89, and IIIa Supplement, Questions 75-80.
15 leftow (2001) provides a useful discussion of what this amounts to for Aquinas.
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despite being disassembled and later reassembled. An accused murderer 
on trial could not argue persuasively that the gun reassembled by police 
in the courtroom could not be the alleged murder weapon on the grounds 
that the murder weapon ceased to exist when police disassembled it at 
the crime scene. The reason we don’t accept the accused murderer’s 
argument is that intuitively we tend to think that numerically one and 
the same gun can be disassembled and later reassembled. Hershenov 
goes on to argue that people are similar to artefacts like the gun, and so 
it is plausible to suppose that we too could undergo disassembly at death 
and later reassembly at the resurrection.
Critics of Hershenov’s response might object that his examples are 
beside the point. resurrection concerns not artefacts but living things, 
and living things like us are not analogous to the artefacts Hershenov 
considers. In particular, living things unlike artefacts persist on account 
of their lives, on account of the continuous biological activities in which 
their components are caught up. An argument along these lines is 
suggested by van Inwagen:
The atoms of which I am composed occupy at each instant the positions 
they do because of the operations of certain processes within me (those 
processes that taken collectively, constitute my being alive) ... [I]f a man ... 
is totally destroyed (as in the case of cremation) then he can never be 
reconstituted, for the causal chain has been irrevocably broken. Thus if 
God collects the atoms that used to constitute the man and ‘reassembles’ 
them, they will occupy the positions relative to one another because of 
God’s miracle and not because of the operation of the natural processes 
that, taken collectively, were the life of the man (1978: 119).
Van Inwagen’s reasoning suggests that if God were to reassemble physical 
particles in a way that exactly resembled me at some time prior to my 
death, the reassembled individual would not be me since it would not 
be living my same life; it would not be continuing the same biological 
activity in which the physical particles that compose me now are 
currently engaged. once that activity ceases – at least in the radical way 
that results from something like cremation – it cannot recommence.16 
but if my life cannot recommence, then I cannot exist again at a  time 
16 In his later work van Inwagen states the idea as follows: ‘If a life has been disrupted, 
it can never begin again; any life that is going on after its disruption is not that life’ 
(1990: 147).
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after I die, and so I cannot be the individual who is composed of any 
materials God assembles after my death.
Hershenov tries to meet this type of objection by challenging the 
necessity of biological continuity for animal existence. Imagine, he says, 
a  human zygote that comes into existence at time t1 in world w1 and 
persists through time t2. In another possible world, w2, that same zygote 
is destroyed an instant after it comes into existence. Its parts are then 
reassembled at time t2 in a way that is indistinguishable from the way 
they are assembled at t2 in w1. The intuition we are supposed to have is 
that there is no relevant difference between the zygote that exists at t2 in 
w1 and the zygote that exists at t2 in w2. If that is the case, then biological 
continuity is irrelevant to the persistence of human organisms, for in both 
w1 and w2 numerically one and the same zygote persists through t2, yet 
in w2 there is no biological continuity since the zygote in w2 underwent 
instantaneous destruction. What is true of the zygote, Hershenov 
continues, is also true of each of us: biological continuity is not necessary 
for our persistence. Consequently, even if I am utterly destroyed when 
I die, it is still metaphysically possible for God to reassemble my parts so 
that the resulting individual is I myself and not a mere replica.
The problem critics are likely to have with this argument is that 
it appears covertly question-begging: someone is not likely to have 
Hershenov’s intuition about organisms, zygotic or otherwise, unless 
he or she already accepts Hershenov’s conclusion; that is, unless he or 
she already believes that biological continuity is not necessary for one 
and the same organism to persist. Someone like van Inwagen who 
thinks to the contrary that biological continuity is necessary for organic 
persistence will think that Hershenov’s intuition is exactly wrong: in w2 
it is not numerically the same zygote that exists at both t1 and t2. For 
this reason defenders of the compatibility thesis might try a  response 
different from Hershenov’s.
An alternative way of responding to van Inwagen’s argument for 
the re-existence restriction does not look to challenge the necessity of 
biological continuity for organic persistence, nor does it depend on 
analogies between artefacts and living things. It instead focuses on 
events, and on the possibility that one and the same event can cease and 
then recommence at a later time.
A sporting event might be suspended on account of the weather. The 
activities of the coaches, players, and spectators that constitute the event 
all cease to occur, and in that sense the event itself ceases to exist. The 
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same event can nevertheless recommence at a  later time provided the 
right conditions are satisfied (conditions usually stated in the league’s 
bylaws). How is the example of events supposed to help with resurrection? 
Hylomorphists can argue that my life is an event whose occurrence 
is sufficient for me to exist. If lives are events like the aforementioned 
sporting events, if they are capable of ceasing and later recommencing, 
then there is a basis for rejecting the re-existence restriction for living 
things such as human beings. If my life ceases to exist when I die, it can 
still recommence at a later time, and if my life recommences, I will once 
again exist. Here is a rough sketch of how hylomorphists might argue for 
this kind of view.
one popular account of events claims that events are property 
exemplifications (Goldman 1970, Kim 1973, bennett 1988). An event, 
on this account, exists exactly if an object has a property at a  time, or 
a number of objects stand in a relation at a time. With this understanding 
of events in mind consider again van Inwagen’s notion of being caught 
up in a life (Section 1 above). A life in van Inwagen’s sense seems to be 
a complex multigrade relation among a number of fundamental physical 
particles. For those particles to be caught up in something’s life at a time 
thus appears to be an event in the aforementioned sense. Hylomorphists 
might now argue that when objects of these sorts stand in that type of 
relation (a  dynamic structure) at a  time, they compose a  distinctive 
individual, a new substance, a living thing such as I am. When I die the 
event that is my life ceases to exist; the physical materials that compose 
me cease to stand in the relevant complex relation. It is nevertheless 
possible for an event that has ceased, to recommence again at a  later 
time. Consequently, it is possible that the event that is my life might 
resume again at a time after I die. but if it is my life that recommences at 
a later time, it seems plausible to suppose that it is I myself who am living 
it, that I myself exist again when my life recommences. Consequently, if 
God can bring it about that my life recommences at a time after I die, that 
some physical materials take on the relevant dynamic structure, then 
God can bring it about that I exist at a time after I die.
Critics might still wonder: How is God able to guarantee that it is 
my life and not some other that recommences after I die? How, in other 
words, is God able to satisfy condition (b) on this account? one idea is 
that each person’s life has a characteristic or set of characteristics that is 
entirely unique to it – a unique relation to God or perhaps a role in the 
universe that only my life can play, something like a vocation in Adams 
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(1987) sense.17 Suppose that this is the case, and that r is a characteristic of 
this sort. Suppose now that I die, and at a later time God wills that my life 
should recommence, that physical materials should carry on the activities 
of a distinctively human life, and in particular the activities of a human life 
that has characteristic r. Since r is unique to my life, since mine is the only 
life that can have r, it must be my life that recommences. And if it is my 
life that recommences, then it seems plausible to suppose that it is I myself 
and no one else who lives it. God is thus able to satisfy condition (b), to 
guarantee that I am the individual who is brought back from the dead.
I’ve just described two broad strategies hylomorphists can follow 
in response to the re-existence restriction. The surviving part strategy 
claims that the restriction is out of play when it comes to resurrection, 
and the gappy existence strategy claims that the restriction is false. 
According to both, the argument for Premise 2 founders. Defenders of 
the compatibility thesis can argue in addition that there is good prima 
facie reason to reject Premise 2. God has managed to bring it about 
once already that some materials have a distinctively human structure 
and compose me and not someone else. Since it has been within God’s 
power to do this at times before my death, there is good reason to think 
it remains within God’s power to do this at times after my death. If the re-
existence restriction obtained, of course, then this would not be the case; 
there would be a difference in what God could do before and after my 
death. but, as we’ve seen, hylomorphists can follow at least two strategies 
for rejecting the restriction. So on balance, hylomorphists can say, we 
have good reason to think that God is capable of satisfying conditions (a) 
and (b); God can bring it about at a time after I die that some materials 
have a distinctively human structure and compose me and not someone 
else, and if that is the case, we have good reason to think that the 
compatibility thesis is true, that hylomorphism is compatible with the 
doctrine of resurrection.
I want to close by considering three objections van Inwagen raises 
to something he calls ‘an “Aristotelian” account of resurrection’ (1978: 
119-120). I want to make it clear that the account he has in mind is not 
the hylomorphic account I’ve just described.
Van Inwagen’s first objection is that it is possible for the physical 
particles that compose me to be destroyed. If that is the case, however, 
17 Perhaps this is one way of interpreting the doctrine that God specially creates each 
human soul.
221HYlomorPHISm AND THe reSurreCTIoN
then it might be impossible for God to reassemble those very particles 
at a time after I die, and in that case, he concludes, resurrection would 
be impossible. Van Inwagen’s second objection is that it is possible for 
the physical particles that compose me at a time to compose someone 
else at a different time. but if that is the case, it is difficult to see what 
principled basis there could be for determining who gets those particles 
at the resurrection. Van Inwagen’s third objection concerns the kind 
of body I will have when I am resurrected. God could reassemble the 
physical particles that composed me when I was a young child into an 
exact replica of my childhood self. God could also, and perhaps even 
simultaneously, reassemble the physical particles that composed me 
when I was an old man into an exact replica of my elderly self. both, it 
seems, could lay claim to being me, yet it is impossible that I should be 
identical to both.
Van Inwagen’s arguments all implicitly assume that resurrection 
requires that the very same physical particles or materials that 
composed me at some time prior to my death should compose me 
when I  am resurrected. but the hylomorphic account of resurrection 
I’ve described is not committed to this. The two strategies I’ve discussed 
are both compatible with God using physical materials other than those 
that composed me at any time prior to my death.18 What is crucial to 
resurrection on both accounts is not the sameness of physical materials 
but of something else: a  surviving part or a  life. on either account 
God can resurrect me using physical particles different from any that 
composed me prior to my death. It is thus irrelevant that some of those 
physical particles should have ceased to exist in the interim, as per van 
Inwagen’s first objection. It is also irrelevant that some of those physical 
particles should have been shared with other people, as per van Inwagen’s 
second objection. All that is relevant is that God bring it about that some 
physical materials or other be structured humanwise at a time after my 
death and either be connected to my surviving part or else continue the 
event that was my life.
An analogous point holds for van Inwagen’s third objection. Suppose 
that God constructs a replica of my young self and a replica of my elderly 
self. Hylomorphism does not imply that I must be identical to either of 
18 It is thus compatible with St. Paul’s idea (1 Cor 15: 35-44) that my resurrected body 
might be in some way different from the natural body I was initially born with, lived 
with, and died with. Paul calls it a ‘spiritual body’ (soma pneumatikon).
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these individuals. According to the surviving part strategy, I am identical 
to one of these individuals or the other only if God has willed that its body 
be joined to my surviving part. And according to the gappy existence 
strategy, I am identical to one of these individuals or the other only if 
God has willed that it be living my life. Since my life and my surviving 
part are unique to me on these accounts, they are not things that could 
be shared by multiple individuals, not even if those individuals are exact 
replicas of me at various stages of my life.
There is a great deal more that could be said about hylomorphism and 
the resurrection. I nevertheless hope that I’ve said enough here to build 
a preliminary case for their compatibility.19
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